

**The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission
Mid-Atlantic Regional Hearing in Baltimore, MD – July 8, 2005
Testimony of U.S. Representative Rush D. Holt (NJ-12)**

Good morning. I am Rush Holt, and I represent the 12th District of New Jersey, which includes Fort Monmouth. Because time is short, I will get right to the presentation. Let me summarize what you have heard about Fort Monmouth today:

- 1) Moving Ft. Monmouth's workforce would diminish US capability in military command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and therefore poses unacceptable risk.
- 2) The Pentagon's cost estimates are not credible.
- 3) The Testing & Evaluation issue is a red herring.
- 4) Finally, we present to you a more strategic approach.

POINT ONE: Moving Ft. Monmouth's Workforce Poses Unacceptable Risk
(MV#1, MV#4, OC #7)

The heart of the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth deviates substantially from several criteria for BRAC decisions. There is substantial deviation from Military Value Criteria Numbers One and Four, as well as "Other Consideration" Number Seven. The error that runs through these deviations is that the Pentagon did not recognize, nor did it evaluate, the fact that an RDAT&E installation's military value is its intellectual capital. R&D facilities are different from submarine bases or air fields. The civilian workforce is central to the RDAT&E mission, and it cannot easily be moved or recreated.

Loss of this workforce would result in unacceptable risk. I'll give you an example. Every day, Fort Monmouth is developing and fielding technologies that are making our soldiers more effective, more efficient, and safer. It is the top-performing installation of its kind. In the categories relevant to Fort Monmouth -- Information Systems Technology & Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare -- the Army ranked it first in three out of four categories. The work of Fort Monmouth is not only future-oriented research, but development and acquisition activities of immediate relevance. And yet, the Pentagon failed to account for the impact on current and future mission capabilities, operational readiness, and joint war fighting.

R&D is a highly collaborative effort done by an experienced, well-educated, and marketable civilian workforce. Past history and a recent professional poll give us substantial reason to believe that only 20% of Fort employees would move. Those who do would be the less experienced, and they will be moving to a place with no pre-existing C4ISR capability or workforce to mentor them. How much diminishment in C4ISR capability in the short term and long term is the BRAC Commission willing to see the military sustain? By way of comparison, would you move a major air base if it meant losing 80% of the planes? Why move the center of land-based for C4ISR if it means losing 80% of the people that make up its military value?

Specificity helps when we talk about the workforce. Taking only the 2055 scientists and engineers – just a portion of the intellectual capital at Fort Monmouth – we are talking about losing the vast majority of:

- 1) 355 Command and Control Engineers, who develop new systems to provide control of fighting forces such as maneuver control system, Blue Force tracking, & FBCB2
- 2) 372 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Engineers, who develop systems such as FireFinder Missile Radar, the Warlock counter-IED System, Trojan, Profit, and support to Intelligence Agencies.
- 3) 461 Space and Terrestrial Communication Engineers, who develop state of the art communications such as WIN-T, Soldier Slice Radio, Near-Term digital radio, and the Joint Network Node, which went to Iraq with the 3rd Infantry Division.
- 4) 517 Engineers who work on night vision at Ft. Belvoir
- 5) 244 Computer Scientists & Software Engineers, who support 215 million lines of code operating these systems; update and reprogram software used in the field; and create new data loads ship them into field via classified e-mail.
- 6) And all of the above are joined by 1600 embedded private contractors, 2400 private contractors outside the gate, and 2480 other C4ISR experts, most of whom are acquisition certified.

It is worth thinking about the degree of disruption that would result from such a move. In the short-term, critical capacity would be lost. Servicing C4ISR equipment that is in the field would take longer; reacting to the next generation of IED's would happen over months instead of weeks; and programs that are near completion will not go to field as expected. The result: our soldiers would experience more danger and higher casualties.

The long-term impact would also be substantial. To cite relevant example, when the Electronic Technology and Devices Laboratory moved from Fort Monmouth to Maryland following the 1995 BRAC, only 40 of the 300 employees relocated. The result was a two-thirds reduction in the number of patents produced by the Lab in the ensuing years. Now transformation is a priority, and the stakes are even higher. Fort Monmouth's R&D Center provides more than half of the advanced technology necessary to make the future combat system a reality. This system is totally dependent on the 19 Fort Monmouth C4ISR programs. If the Fort's workforce is lost, transformation will be disrupted.

Let me now address the issue of reconstitution. Military Value Criteria Number Four requires the Pentagon to evaluate the manpower implications of the move. It did not. Even if qualified workers were immediately available in and around Aberdeen, reconstitution of a Fort Monmouth-caliber workforce would take approximately ten years. The reason for this is that it takes time to recruit, screen, and hire even a small number of workers, particularly scientists and engineers. Security clearances take 12-18 months. The average C4ISR expert requires 2-3 years of formal training, and an additional 4-6 years of continued learning before he or she achieves systems level expertise in Defense-specific domains, such as information warfare. It would take time – years – to attain the same degree of expertise. The Pentagon did not account for that.

As I said, this would be the case even if an equivalent, high caliber workforce were immediately available. But as it happens, the facts do not bear that out. You have heard already the comparison of central New Jersey's workforce to Maryland's, so I will not go into great depth again. Suffice it to say that the Pentagon substantially deviated from "Other Consideration" #7 when it failed to account for a rocky move from central New Jersey to Aberdeen, MD.

POINT TWO: Cost Estimates Are Not Credible (OC#5)

The Pentagon also breached "Other Consideration" Number Five. Simply put, its estimates on the extent and timing of potential costs and savings are not credible. In almost every category pertaining to closing Fort Monmouth, costs were ignored or low-balled. For example the DoD failed to consider:

- The financial and programmatic costs associated with losing the vast majority of Fort Monmouth's highly skilled R&D workforce.
- The cost of replacing this highly skilled workforce.
- The cost of training a new workforce of 3000 people.
- The costs associated with delayed and disrupted programs.
- And lastly, the Pentagon seriously low-balled military construction. Our analysis shows that re-creating Fort Monmouth's highly specialized laboratories, testing facilities, and workspace would require massive investment.

Overall, the DoD underestimates the cost of this BRAC recommendation by about a factor of two – almost a billion dollars.

POINT THREE: T&E Issue Is a Red Herring (MV#2)

The Pentagon also failed to correctly assess Fort Monmouth according to the second criterion for Military Value, which ostensibly measures the availability and condition of land, facilities, and airspace. This is important because one of the main arguments for moving Fort Monmouth's mission to Aberdeen is greater synergy between R&D and T&E. This argument ignores reality.

- 1) First, much C4ISR Testing and Evaluation takes place in labs, computers, and anechoic chambers – not on open fields.
- 2) Aberdeen's primary feature is that it has lots of open space, and the DoD presumably wants to use that space for field testing C4ISR. Unfortunately, this recommendation was born out of the Pentagon's failure to consider that Ft. Monmouth *already does* land and air T&E at the Dix-Lakehurst-McGuire Joint Base. Fort Monmouth's mission does not need to move to Aberdeen in order gain T&E maneuver space. In fact, testing at Aberdeen would require re-creating facilities, transporting soldiers, and moving equipment already at Ft. Monmouth and Dix-Lakehurst-McGuire.
- 3) And lastly, some T&E cannot be done at Dix/Lakehurst or Aberdeen. This T&E will continue to take place at places like Yuma Proving Ground and Fort Huachuca (where there are radio quiet conditions), or Forts Irwin, Hood, and Bliss (where there are large numbers of soldiers).

It is worth noting at this point that the Pentagon's recommendation does nothing to enhance jointness, and in fact, detracts from it. It rips Fort Monmouth away from its

network of joint operations with Dix-Lakehurst-McGuire, and places it at Aberdeen – an Army-to-Army move. We believe we can do better on that score and others.

We offer a more strategic approach:

- 1) Maintain and enhance C4ISR capacity by keeping highly-expert workforce at Fort Monmouth.
- 2) Formally make Fort Monmouth a sub-installation of the “Joint Mega-Base” at Lakehurst/Dix/McGuire. All responsibility for Garrison management and operation would be transferred to the Joint Base Headquarters, providing some efficiencies. This would institutionalize opportunities for greater joint DoD C4ISR programs, and perhaps,
- 3) Permit establishment of a Joint C4ISR Command to improve battlefield cross-service operability.
- 4) Cede excess portions of the installation from Federal jurisdiction. This will realize some financial savings, and permit non-DoD activities present on the installation (e.g., the VA, FEMA, FBI, etc.) to continue operating with little or no impact.

I could go on to discuss more, but I will stop here. If you have any questions or seek additional materials, please do not hesitate to ask. Thank you.