

**Funding Under HR 811 (as amended by House Administration Committee) –**

\$1 billion -- Equipment replacement and upgrade (\$700 million more than original bill)

- For FY 2007 and until expended
- Disbursement based on formula identifying number of remedial precincts
- Can be used as a reimbursement
- Can be used to upgrade or replace equipment purchased with HAVA funds

\$100 million – Cost of Audits

- For each FY (every primary takes place before October 1 and every general election takes place after October 1)
- Disbursement based on certification from States as to actual/ reasonably anticipated costs
- overpayments can be recouped

\$3 million -- NIST study into accessible ballot verification mechanisms

\$3 million -- NSF study into election dedicated voting system software

- \$1.5 million each for FY 2007 & FY 2008

\$100,000 -- NIST development of best practices for alternative ballot sampling method  
“such sums as necessary” -- EAC Testing Escrow Account, to establish and maintain it

**\$1,106,100,000** – Total (not including such additional sums as necessary for escrow account and not reflecting continuing nature of audit funding)

**Deadlines under HR 811 (as amended by House Administration Committee) –**

Within 90 Days of Enactment –

- Paperless States to certify how they will meet requirements of the legislation
- States to identify the number of non-compliant and partially-compliant precincts they have and describe how the State will use the funding under the bill to meet the requirements of the bill

January 2008

- Establishment of Testing Escrow account and fee schedule

March 2008

- EAC to publish procedures for random selection of precincts

May 2008

- NIST to publish guidance on best practices for alternative ballot sampling methods

August 2008

- EAC Best Practices for documenting secure chain of custody to be published
- States to publish procedures by which they will resolve discrepancies in audits

November 2008

- Compliance with durable paper ballot and accessible paper ballot verification requirements for all jurisdictions that did not use paper ballot based systems in 2006
- Prohibition on connecting the voter to the vote (maintaining privacy of the voter)
- Instruction to voters to verify paper ballots
- Prohibition on the use of undisclosed, uncertified (by the State) software, and uncertified (by the State) last-minute software patches
- Ban on the use of wireless devices
- Ban on Internet connections to voting machines, tabulators and ballots programmers
- Requirement to document secure chain of custody
- Requirement that ballots be readable without assistance and scannable (although not the requirement that they be scanned; all paper is already scannable by an OCR scanner)
- Requirement that emergency paper ballots be given upon machine failure
- Notice of right to emergency ballot and training of election officials
- Requirements that manufacturers submit all equipment to be tested through the Testing Escrow account, test labs be required to publish test results, EAC be required to disclose information re: labs that lose or regain accreditation
- States to begin to conduct audits under the bill

December 2008

- NIST to complete accessible ballot verification study

January 2010 (First federal election in 2010)

- States using paper-ballot based systems (thermal reel-to-reel and/or accessible systems that used or produced a paper ballot) in 2006 to be in compliance with durable paper and accessible paper ballot verification requirements of HR 811
- Paper ballot on request in DRE jurisdictions